Abstract-Wireless sensor networks are confronted with unique challenges. Absence of infrastructure support, the key distribution is one of the most challenging security problems in wireless sensor networks, and the traditional security techniques used in tradition networks cannot be applied directly. We propose an IBE-based authentication protocol as the security scheme, which can achieve the key establishment and security authentication. The security of the authentication protocol is analyzed based on BAN logic. The simulation shows, comparing with previous keyestablishment solutions, our approaches need little storage space, and can gain stronger security and reasonable performance efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor network comes into being alone with the development of micro sensor devices. Wireless sensor networks consist of a large number of self-organizing, low-power, low-cost wireless sensor nodes. Wireless sensor network can be deployed in rugged environment because of whose nature. The applications of wireless sensor network include ocean and wildlife monitoring, manufacturing machinery performance monitoring, building safety and earthquake monitoring, and many military applications. Wireless sensor networks are composed by a large amount of small, resource constrained devices, called sensor nodes, which have limited sensing, computing and wireless communication abilities.
Traditional security techniques used in traditional networks cannot be applied directly in wireless sensor networks because of whose nature character. First, sensor devices only have limited energy, computation, and communication capabilities. Second, sensor nodes are often deployed in accessible areas, presenting the added risk of physical attack. Consequently, existing security mechanisms are unaccommodated to wireless sensor networks, and new techniques are needed. Now, the security issues in the wireless sensor networks mainly include key establishment, secrecy, authentication, privacy, robustness to denial-of-service attacks, secure routing, and node capture.
In wireless sensor networks, one of the most important issues is to establish cryptographic keys [1] . One of the approaches is key-establishment protocols, and many protocols have been proposed. But because of the inherent properties of wireless sensor networks, existing key-establishment protocols can't be used in wireless sensor networks. Many sensor devices have limited computational power, and can't afford the computational cost of public-key cryptographic.
The other way for key establishment is network wide shared key. However, there is hidden trouble. Even if a single node in a network would leak the secret key would result in decryption of all network traffic [2] . And an improved idea is to use a single shared key to establish a set of link keys, one per pair of communicating nodes, then erase the network wide key after setting up the session keys. However, this method makes the addition of new nodes difficult.
Another approach is to preconfigure the network with a shared unique symmetric key between each pair of nodes. However, it cost large storage space. If a sensor network has n nodes, each node needs to store n-1 keys, and n*(n-1)/2 keys need to be established in the network.
And there are several other approaches for key establishment, such as public-key cryptography (such as Diffie-Hellman key establishment), which asks for costly spending. Bootstrapping keys using a trusted base station is also an option. Where, each node needs to share only a single key with the base station and set up keys with other nodes through the base station. This method makes the base station a single point of failure and adds the cost of communication. Recently, random-key predistribution protocols [3] are brought forward in which a large pool of symmetric keys is chosen and a random subset of the pool is distributed to each sensor node. When two nodes try to communicate, they search their pools to determine whether they share a common key. If they have shared a common key, they use it to establish a session key. And in theory, the key-establishment probability is sufficiently great. The disadvantage of this approach is that attackers who compromised sufficiently many nodes could also reconstruct the complete key pool and break the scheme.
Secrecy and authentication are also the important problems that wireless sensor networks must resolve. Like traditional networks, it is important to protect wireless sensor networks applications against eavesdropping, injection, and modification of packets [4, 5] . Obviously, cryptography is the perfect solution. Cryptography increases packet size and performance cost for extra computation. Hardware cryptography increases efficiency but also increases the financial cost of implementing a network.
So it is significative to research software-only cryptographic implementations that can achieve the reasonable security and performance efficiency.
In wired networks, there are plenteous resources, and fixed infrastructure, which can establish complicated security chains and realize authentication. So PKI [6] can be selected as the security solution. PKI is extremely secure actually from the cryptographic standpoint nevertheless it considers resource little. So in wireless sensor networks, the application of PKI further aggravates the wireless sensor networks performance and easily leads to traffic congestion, channel error, and lowlevel service quality. And because of the limited resource, the security routing protocols of wireless sensor networks propose distributing the shared keys or the public keys beforehand, and it is urgent to look for the appropriate measures of key management according to the special structure and application situation of wireless sensor networks. So it is urgent to develop suitable security mechanisms for protecting wireless sensor networks.
The IBE system is the appropriate solution that can realize the security service similarly to PKI without the support of the fixed infrastructure. Shamir proposes identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [7] in 1984 with the motivation to simplify certificate management in Email systems. IBE enables any pair of users to communicate securely, and it can verify each other's signatures without exchanging public/ private keys. What's more, the scheme need not keep any key directories and does not rely on the third party to provide certification service. In 2001, Dan Boneh and Matthew Frankliny proposes a fully functional identity-based encryption(IBE) scheme [8] . [9] puts forward a key management method based on IBE in 1999. The scheme uses the unique identifier as the public key and does not relies on the third party to provide authentication service. [10] presents an efficient and provably secure IBE scheme without bilinear map. and [11] proposes Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) systems.
In this paper, we propose using Combined Public Key (CPK) based on IBE as the security solution in wireless sensor networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II suggests the prerequisite hypothesis. Section III introduces the proposed wireless sensor networks security solution. Section IV analyzes the security based on the BAN logic. Section V simulates the performance of our solution comparing with several existing solutions. Section VI draws a conclusion about our research. Section VII is the acknowledgement.
II. THE PREREQUISITE HYPOTHESIS
(1) In this paper, the attack comes from physical layer and data link layer is not considered. And suppose that the networks can intercommunicate, namely, if node A can transmit message to node B, then node B can transmit message to node A.
(2) In initial phase, suppose that the Certificate Authority (CA) distributes the ID, certificate, and the public key of CA to each node. Namely, only the legitimate nodes can obtain the certificate and the public key of CA.
(3) This paper doesn't discuss the security of cryptography, which is another subject to study.
III. PROPOSED WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS SOLUTION
A. Introduction of CPK based on IBE CPK [9] is a new centralized key management mode which is proposed by Nan Xiang-Hao at 1999. CPK realizes the security relying on the hard problems of discrete logarithm, and resolves the large-scale key management problem using few "seeds" produce "infinity" public keys. In CPK technique, through constructing public key factor matrix and private-key factor matrix and a given mapping algorithm, can computed the public key and private key. CPK uses the identifier as the public key, and realizes the authentication independent of the trusted third part. The particular working process is as following: the key management center (KMC) produces many key factors, and through the key factors, can combine plentiful public key/ private key pairs. KMC takes charge of all the private keys and distributes them to user safely. In accustomed public key cryptography, all the users promulgate their public keys, however, all the public keys reserve in absolutely secure chip in CPK. CPK doesn't promulgate the public key directly, it promulgates the public key factor matrix, and users can compute the public key through the public key matrix and the mapping algorithm.
CPK can structure Key management system based on discrete logarithm problem of finite field, and also be adapt to discrete logarithm problem of elliptic curve. Because the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) can achieve equivalent security with RSA using much smaller key sizes than RSA, Obviously, ECC is more suitable for wireless sensor networks. [9, 12] In 1985, Koblitz and Miller respectively propose ECC cryptography. Because of ECC using small key size (160 bits) can realize the equivalent security with RSA using bit key size (1024 bits), ECC develops rapidly.
B. The Foundation of ECC
Affine coordinates are the common coordinates in ECC. ECC are defined over fields of odd characteristic and fields of characteristic two ( The points on an elliptic curve form an abelian group. So they satisfy the characters of abelian group such as commutativity, associativity and so on.
For any point G the set ( , , ,
a cyclic group. The calculation of kG (k is an integer and G is a point) is called scalar multiplication.
C. Key Factor Matrix and the Mapping Algorithm
The key distribution and management in large-scale networks is an unfathomed issue before the public key technique comes forth. The problem is solved along with the appearance of public key technique. PKI adopting public key technique provides security infrastructure. Commonly, PKI bind public key and user, and assure the integrality of public key through CA, However, CA is adapt to large-scale and open networks circumstance. And in wireless sensor networks, the large cost in constructing the authentication chains can't be endured, so CA is not the perfect solution. CPK can resolve the problem felicitously. Differ from the common public key system, CPK does not open the public keys, it only opens the public key factor matrix that has small size. User can compute the public key through a given mapping algorithm. In this paper, we discuss the principle of CPK based on ECC over fields of odd characteristic.
Let T= (a, b, G, n, p), where a, b are the parameters of ECC, G is basic point and n is the order of ECC, p is the order of fields of odd characteristic p F . For any
Key factor matrix is produced by KMC offline. KMC establish public-key factor matrix and private-key factor matrix using a number of public-key/private-key factor pairs. The column of the matrix denotes the hiberarchy of combination, and the row denotes the key variables in every level. Let the size of matrix is m n × -matrix, so there are n levels, and every level contains m key variables. Let private-key factor matrix and public key factor matrix are m n × -matrix. Private-key factor matrix and public key factor matrix are as following: Private-key factor matrix 11 12 1
Public-key factor matrix 11 12 1
The public key of user is determined by the exclusive identifier, and the exclusive identifier is band with the public key. The public/private keys can be computed by adopting mapping algorithm according to the public/private key matrixes. 
add operation of point in elliptical curve E cost little computational overhead. Both sides of communications can realize the digital signatures and secret-key exchange using the public/private key pair.
D. Computation and Distribution of Key
The combination and production of the public/private key pairs is a distinct innovation in CPK. The method makes it impossible using few resources as "seeds" to produce a large number of public/private key pairs. By the mapping algorithm, which can map user's identifier into n mapping values, KMC can compute the public key and the private key through combination principle. E.g. Let n mapping values of user A be 1 2 ( , , )
can get the element of row i t in column t (t=1, 2… n) of the public key matrix and compute the private key of user A, namely
distributes the private key to user A in a secure channel, such as smart card. The way distributing private key is suitable for wireless sensor networks.
E. Identity Authentication
If verifier(user B) wants to get the public key of user A, he can compute n mapping values of user A according his identifier and mapping algorithm, and then because the public key matrix is published by the KMC, so he can compute the public key of user A in the same way, namely 
User A has got the private key SK A from KMC, and the verifier can compute the public key of user A easily.
Both sides of communications can realize the digital signature and secret-key exchange.
The key exchange and identity authentication can be described as follows: 
The message sequence is presented in figure1. In our scheme, the key management is offline, and every node can easily gets the public key factor matrix and authenticates the identity of other member by the unique identifier, so the authentication between A and the server S, B and server S can be omitted. 
F. The Conservation of Secret Keys
In CPK, the private-key factor matrix is conserved in KMC which requires absolutely secure, and the public key factor matrix can be promulgated in the common medium, or be conserved in the special medium that can be distributed to users. The authentication process in CPK does not rely on trusted third part because every user has the only identifier, so in CPK, KMC can produce and conserve the private-key matrix offline, and CPK almost does not need fixed infrastructure. During the communication, CPK doesn't require building complicated authentication chains, but can achieve security authentication similarly to PKI.
Different from the traditional authentication system, which conserves all of the public/private key-pairs and holds a lot of space, the KMC in CPK conserves the secret-key matrix that cost small size. Suppose the key factor matrix of CPK is m n × -matrix, it requires storage m n × , but can combine m n different keys. E.g. the 32*16-matrix requires space to store 32*16=512 keys, but the matrix can produce 32 16 keys.
G. Joining and leaving of the Member Nodes
For some reason, there are some nodes need to join or leave. If one node wants to join in the wireless sensor network, the CA needs to validate the identity, and KMC distributes the new node an exclusive ID. The new node gets its public/private key pair. And the public key factor matrix does not require to be changed.
When one node is declared revoked, the KMC S broadcast the message as follows:
IV. THE SECURITY OF THE SCHEME
The pivotal part of the security in CPK is the confidentiality of private-key factor matrix. In ECC, it is a known difficulty problem to compute the corresponding private-key factor k given public-key factor k G ⋅ , so it is impossible to achieve the private-key factor through given public key factor matrix.
CPK can resist coalition attacks, that is, it is impossible to get the private-key factor matrix even if the adversary grasps a majority of private keys. Suppose the adversary gets the private key SK a of user A and the private key SK b of user B, suppose among the corresponding n mapping values of private keys SK a and SK b , n-1 of them are equal. So (SK a -SK b ) can eliminate the influence of n-1 equivalent key factors. However, it can't achieve the private-key factor through (SK a -SK b ). The private-key factor matrix is still secure.
Authentication protocols are the basis of security in many distributed systems. But it is difficult to design a secure protocol conforming to the security goals. Many protocols contain redundancies or security flaws. In this paper, we analyze the security based on BAN logic [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] .
A. Symbols Definition
We define the symbols firstly. There are several objects in the logic ： principals, encryption keys, and formulas (also called statements). In this paper, the symbols A, B, P, Q and S denote specific principals; ab K denotes shared keys; A K , B K and S K denote specific public keys, and 
B. The Logical Rules
There are some basic logical rules:
That is, if P believes that k is the shared key with Q and P sees <X> k , then P believes that Q once said X. In the other words, If
Where K denotes the public key, and K -1 is the private key. The rule express: if P believes that k is the public key of Q, and P sees
That is, if
,
That is, if P believes that the secret X is shared with Q and sees { } X P Y , then P believes that Q once said Y.
In the other words, If
That is, if P believes that X is fresh, and P believes that Q once said X, then P believes that Q believes X.
That is, if P believes that Q has jurisdiction over X, and P believes that Q believes X, then P trusts Q on the truth of X.
That is, if P believe that Q once said ( , ) X Y , then P believes that Q once said X (7) #( )
That is, if P believes that X is fresh, then P believes that ( , ) X Y is fresh.
That is, if P believes that Q believes ( , ) X Y , then P believes that Q believes X.
C. The security goals
Usually, authentication provides the security protection for the communication by a shared session key.
The hypotheses state what keys are initially shared between the principals, which principals have generated fresh, and which principals are trusted. The hypotheses are standard and obvious for the type of protocol. The goals of authentication protocols are to protect the communication security. We can consider that the authentication is complete between A and B if one of the following formulas comes into existence. 
D. The Protocol Analyzed
In our scheme, the KMC is offline, and key distribution is also performed offline. Every node believes S and the public key factor matrix generated by S. So we can first give the following assumptions.
, ,
We can know that the ID A and ID B just are used for the convenient computation of public keys, so we can ignore ID A and ID B during the discussion of security. We idealize the protocol as follows: According to the logical rules, we can deduce the authentication protocol and get the logical goal as follows:
Message1: 
The hypothesis shows, A believes that K S is the public key of the server S, and A sees 
so according to rule (4) and rule (7), we can obtain the following formula: [ , ] Message2: Message3: 
is fresh, so according to rule (4) and rule (7), we can obtain the following formula:
believes that K A is the public key of itself, so according to rule (8) and (9), we can gain the result:
We can know that the key exchange process is secure.
V. SIMULATION
In these experiments, there are 100 nodes randomly deployed in a rectangle field 120*120 m 2 . The sink node is located at (0, 0). We use the 802.11 MAC layer, and the radio range is 8m. We will contrast several key management schemes, such as E-G key management scheme [22] , SPINS (security protocols for wireless sensor networks) [23] , LEAP (localized encryption and authentication protocol) [24] . We evaluate the performance from the two aspects: the availability and the energy consumption [25] of the wireless sensor network. When the network traffic load increases from 10 to 100, the simulation result is showed as following:
Availability: when there are 120 nodes, along with aggravation of the network traffic load. The comparing results show as following: when the network traffic load increases from 10-100 packets/s (512B for each packet). As shown in Figure 2 , the success ratio in SPIN scheme drops from 98% to 88%, the success ratio in E-G scheme drops from 97% to 81%, the success ratio in CPK-based scheme drops from 94% to 71%, the success ratio in LEAP scheme drops from 93% to 62%. Figure 3 , the normalized energy consumption in SPIN scheme increases from 1 J to 4 J, the normalized energy consumption in E-G scheme increases from 1.1 J to 4.8 J, the normalized energy consumption in CPKbased scheme increases from 1.2 J to 6.5 J, the normalized energy consumption in LEAP scheme increases from 1.1 J to 9.3 J Obviously, SPIN and E-G can get better performance, however, they do not using public-key cryptography to ensure the security, which do not adapt to the application circumstance that require high-level security [26, 27] . The method based on CPK has strong security because it is based on public-key cryptography, and can gain finer performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first analyze the unique challenges in wireless sensor networks, sum up the previous keyestablishment solutions from the advantage and the disadvantage. We then propose the authentication protocol based on IBE, which costs much less resource compared with PKI to realize the equivalent confidentiality, integrality, reliability, and indeniability. Comparing with prevailing security key-establishment solutions, IBE-based security scheme cannot gain better efficiency, but it can ensure the stronger security. We analyze the authentication security of our scheme based on BAN logic, and the result shows that our scheme is secure in the frame of the logic. And through the simulations, we can know that IBE-based security scheme can complete key establishment and security authentication and gain reasonable security and performance efficiency.
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